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ABSTRACT  
   
Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate 
the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 
executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for 
communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the 
potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures 
of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive 
are positively related to future firm value (Tobin's Q); (2) the beneficial 
effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance or 
CEO incentive alignment, with stronger incentives for the No. 2 executives 
to monitor, and with higher information asymmetry between the boards 
and the CEOs; (3) such mutual monitoring reduces the CEO's ability to 
pursue the "quiet life" but has no effect on "empire building;" and (4) 
mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The 
results suggest that mutual monitoring by a No. 2 executive provides 
checks and balances on CEO power. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Public corporations are managed by teams of executives.  The 
CEO, the number 1 executive in charge, generally has been the focus of 
attention in the academic literature and among investors, the media, and 
regulators.  Nonetheless, other members of the executive team are likely 
to play important roles in the firm.  Top executives likely bring expertise to 
the formulation of investment, financial, and payout policies.  They are a 
potential source of talent in succession planning for the CEO position.  
They collaborate with other members of the team in decision making.  
Finally, they potentially serve in the capacity of mutual monitors.  In this 
paper, I focus on this last role and empirically examine whether mutual 
monitoring can constrain the potentially self-interested CEO.  In particular, 
I develop measures of the presence and likely effectiveness of mutual 
monitoring by a “number 2” executive and assess the extent to which 
those measures are associated with firm performance, investment policy, 
and various aspects of firm governance and executive incentives. 
I rely on the notion that mutual monitoring among managers in a 
well-structured authority system mitigates the agency problem.  Alchian 
and Demsetz (1972), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), and 
Fama and Jensen (1983) all stress mutual monitoring as an important 
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control mechanism.1  To frame the nature of mutual monitoring among 
members of an executive team, I note the following. 
Although the CEO is the focal point for leadership and decision 
making, managing the firm requires significant teamwork (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984).  First, top executives other than the CEO often possess a 
set of responsibilities that only modestly intersect with those of the CEO.  
For example, the CFO often leads on financial reporting (Jiang, Petroni, 
and Wang, 2010) and the COO often presides over the day-to-day 
operations (Marcel, 2009).  Second, the CEO needs collaboration from 
other team members.  A top executive can withhold effort or information 
as a means of passive monitoring (Acharya et al., 2011).  Or an executive 
can damage or effectively veto a CEO initiative by impeding 
implementation, termed “optimal dissent” by Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar 
(2009).  In the extreme, an executive may leave the company due to 
disagreement with the CEO.  Third, a non-CEO can influence the CEO by 
providing expertise, advice, and perspective.  Often the information on 
product markets, operations, marketing, accounting, and finance flows 
through top executives to the CEO.  And executives will bring different 
aptitudes, training, and experience to the various aspects of management 
(Bertrand and Schoar, 2003).  Fourth, named executive officers (NEOs) 
                                            
1 Recent literature on mutual monitoring includes Baker, Jensen, and 
Murphy (1988), Drago and Garvey (1998), Core and Guay (2001), 
Hochberg and Lindsey (2010), and Acharya, Myers, and Rajan (2011). 
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possess resources and mechanisms to influence the CEO indirectly.  
Some NEOs have channels to the board and some themselves serve on 
the board.  An executive can bring CEO behavior that is self-serving, 
fraudulent, unethical, or otherwise illegal to the attention of other 
employees or the board or, in the extreme, to regulators, the media, or 
even law enforcement authorities.2  Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2010) 
found employees play the most important role in fraud detection because 
of their access to inside information.  In many cases, the second-in-
command or other NEO has a fiduciary obligation to provide important and 
accurate information to the board, and boards routinely actively seek 
information and insight from executives other than the CEO.  In theory and 
practice, mutual monitoring can lead to better executive decisions 
pertaining to investment and financial policy and to a lower likelihood of 
unfortunate or illegal events or corporate disaster. 
Of course, the presence and effectiveness of mutual monitoring will 
vary in the authority, credibility, and influence of team members, whether 
team members have access to relevant information, and proximity of team 
members to decision-making processes.  My measures of mutual 
monitoring reflect these tensions.   
                                            
2 A recent survey found 78% of Americans would blow the whistle on 
workplace wrongdoing under the protections and incentives now being 
offered by the SEC’s new whistleblower program, part of the Dodd-Frank 
financial reform. The survey suggested higher-rank employees were more 
likely to be privy to misconduct and were more likely to blow the whistle. 
(Wall Street Journal, 2011) 
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To measure mutual monitoring, I focus on executives I surmise to 
be second-in-command to the CEO.3  In the framework of mutual 
monitoring, conferring authority on the No. 2 executive is particularly 
important, because such executives can closely observe the CEOs on a 
routine basis whereas even the most diligent boards cannot.  Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972) suggest the No. 2 executive in the firm, if given proper 
authority and channels, is able to constrain the self-serving actions of the 
CEOs.4  Of course, the second-in-command can be extremely powerful in 
some firms, even to the point of ousting the CEO, whereas her influence 
can be insignificant in other firms.  
I identify the No. 2 executive as the highest paid employee other 
than the CEO.5  I use the gap between the compensation of the CEO and 
that of the second-highest-paid executive scaled by CEO total 
compensation, as a proxy for the authority differential between the two 
executives, and, thus, as a proxy for the relative monitoring capacity of the 
No. 2.  This pay gap, hereafter known as the “GAP,” is likely to be 
                                            
3 Mutual monitoring is more effective in a well-balanced authority structure 
as well as in small-group settings.  In large groups, agents tend to free 
ride (Isaac and Walker, 1988) and have natural limits to observing each 
other (Heckathorn, 1988; Kandel and Lazear, 1992).  In this sense, the 
No. 2 executive is a natural focal point for examining mutual monitoring. 
4 On the contrary, an unbalanced authority structure may prohibit mutual 
monitoring.  For example, Rothschild and Miethe (1999) found 
undemocratic work environments set significant barriers to internal 
whistle-blowing. 
5 An alternative categorization that ignores the “CEO” title and defines the 
No.1 and No. 2 by their total compensation produces similar results. 
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correlated with various attributes of the second-in-command relative to the 
CEO, including skill, power, and influence (as distinct from formal 
authority), all of which determine monitoring capability.   
Second, I create a variable that indicates whether the No. 2 
executive also serves as a director on the company board.  Director-No. 2 
is a dummy that takes the value one if the No. 2 is a board director in her 
firm, zero otherwise.  The presence of an additional executive on the 
board reduces the information asymmetry vis-à-vis the CEO, which is 
likely to enhance the monitoring effectiveness of the board (Inderst and 
Mueller, 2009).  Board membership provides the executive with formal and 
informal channels for monitoring authority and information transmission.6   
Third, because titles are likely to represent structural power, 
influence, and access to information (Finkelstein, 1992), I consider 
whether the No. 2 executive also holds the title of “President.”  President-
                                            
6 Due to information asymmetry, even “highly talented board members” 
from the outside have a natural limit as to what can be accomplished 
through direct monitoring (Jensen, 1993).  Empirical studies suggest that 
structural “improvements” to the board, for example, by increasing 
representation of outside directors, only have modest effects (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2003).  On a priori grounds, efforts to improve boards need 
not be limited to board structure in a narrow sense, but can also be 
shaped by governance processes.  For example, any governance 
instrument or process that reduces the information asymmetry between 
the CEO and board will also make the board a better monitor (Inderst and 
Mueller, 2009).  In particular, Fama and Jensen (1983) contend that 
mutual monitoring mitigates the problem by generating low-cost 
information about the CEO to be used in the control process.  In their 
words, “The board is the top-level court of appeals of the internal agent 
market, and as such it must be able to use information from the internal 
mutual monitoring system.”  
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No. 2 is a dummy equal to one if the No. 2 is the president of the firm, zero 
otherwise.  Generally, the No. 2 executive can supply more checks and 
balances relative to the CEO if she is the president of the firm than if she 
is one of the vice presidents and the CEO is the president (Worrell, 
Demec, and Davidson, 1997). 
Finally, if the No. 2 joined the firm after the CEO, she is more likely 
to be loyal to or serve at the pleasure of the CEO (Landier, Sraer, and 
Thesmar, 2006).  A No. 2 appointed prior to the CEO is less likely to be 
co-opted7 and is more likely to monitor the CEO.  The measure I employ 
indicates whether the No. 2 was appointed prior to the CEO.  
Independent-No. 2 is a dummy that equals one if the No. 2 joined the 
company before the CEO, zero otherwise.   Mutual monitoring will be 
more effective when the GAP is smaller and when one or more of the 
three indicator variables takes the value of one. 
I use these four proxies to test the implications of mutual monitoring 
for firm performance and policy, and to examine the relation between 
mutual monitoring and other governance characteristics.  My analysis 
yields four classes of results. 
First, I empirically identify executive, board, and firm characteristics 
that are associated with the measures of mutual monitoring.  I find, for 
example, that the GAP is positively correlated with governance quality 
                                            
7 I adopt this notion from Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2010), who develop 
the same argument for outside directors. 
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measures.  This result is inconsistent with the notion that poor governance 
allows CEO entrenchment and corresponding rent extraction through 
compensation that is excessive relative to other executives (e.g., 
Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer, 2011).  Instead, my results suggest a 
lower GAP represents stronger mutual monitoring by the second-in-
command, which in turn can allow the firm to substitute away from more 
expensive governance mechanisms, such as direct monitoring by the 
board.  
Second, I find a significant relation between firm performance and 
the measures of mutual monitoring.  For example, for an increase in the 
GAP of one standard deviation, Tobin’s Q one period forward is lower by 
the equivalent of $20 million.8  In my sample, Tobin’s Q one period 
forward is significantly and positively related to the three indicator 
variables for mutual monitoring, specifically Director-No. 2, President-No. 
2, and Independent-No. 2.  These results are consistent with the presence 
of mutual monitoring and the relevance of mutual monitoring for firm 
performance.   
The “CEO Pay Slice” (CPS) of Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer 
(2011), which is CEO pay divided by total pay to the top 5 executives, is a 
                                            
8 Consistent with my results, one anecdote involves the legendary 
financier J.P. Morgan, who followed a rule of never investing in a firm in 
which CEO pay is more than double the second highest pay. 
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similar measure that is likely to be related to mutual monitoring.9  When I 
include both the GAP and CPS in the specifications of firm performance 
on firm structure and executive characteristics, the GAP tends to have 
more statistical and economic power in determining firm performance.  
The estimated magnitude of the “GAP effect” is approximately double that 
of the “CPS effect.”  One possible reason is that the second-in-command 
is more relevant in mutual monitoring than any other executive further 
down the chain of authority.   
Third, I find the effect of mutual monitoring on firm performance is 
of greater significance and magnitude when other aspects of corporate 
governance are weak according to conventional measures.  Under weak 
external governance or CEO incentive alignment, internal mutual 
monitoring becomes more important and therefore has a stronger effect 
on firm performance.  This result again suggests mutual monitoring is an 
effective substitute for other governance systems.   
Furthermore, my four measures of mutual monitoring interact with 
CEO duality, horizon difference between the top two executives, and 
industry homogeneity, in a way that suggests the effect of mutual 
monitoring on firm performance is more prominent in firms where the No. 
                                            
9 Bebchuk et al. (2011) find that CEO dominance, as proxied by CPS, 
could damage firm value.  As a key departure from their paper and other 
“pay gap” literature, which have focused on agency cost of an 
overpowered CEO proxied by pay gap, this paper suggests a failed mutual 
monitoring mechanism due to an unbalanced authority system by using 
the pay gap as a relative measure. 
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2 executive has sufficient incentive to monitor and where the information 
asymmetry between the board and the CEO is high.  Additional results 
show that the monitoring role of the No. 2 executive as board director is 
more important post-SOX than pre-SOX.  The constraints on board 
independence imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may have 
unintentionally weakened mutual monitoring.  
Finally, I find evidence to support the “quiet life” hypothesis 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003) but not the “empire building” 
hypothesis.  In particular, I find the GAP is positively related to selling, 
general, and administrative expenses and wages, but not related to 
measures of firm scale and executive span of control.  The results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that monitoring from the second-in-
command prevents the CEO from avoiding “cognitively difficult activities,” 
such as haggling with labor unions, input suppliers, and organizational 
units demanding bigger overhead budgets.  In contrast, the results provide 
little support for the notion that mutual monitoring reduces empire building. 
Endogeneity in performance-on-structure and structure-on-structure 
experiments is a common and difficult problem (e.g., Roberts and Whited, 
2011).  In my empirical context, if shareholders can optimally assign the 
monitoring capacity to the No. 2 executive and adjust it in an 
instantaneous and costless way, there should be no empirical relation 
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between mutual monitoring and firm performance.10  It is plausible, 
however, that the transaction costs of altering the authority system of 
mutual monitoring are present and nontrivial, so that one would be more 
likely to expect to observe a connection between my measures of mutual 
monitoring and firm performance, policy, and governance structure.  
Indeed, statistically the empirical results in the paper are robust to using a 
variety of relevant control variables and econometric methods.  I also 
show that the endogeneity problem works against finding the relation 
between mutual monitoring and firm performance.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
describes the data and Section 3 provides statistical description of the No. 
2 compared to the CEO.  Section 4 examines the relation of mutual 
monitoring and executive, firm, and governance attributes.  Section 5 
identifies the relation between mutual monitoring and firm performance, 
while Section 6 shows this relation depends on other governance 
characteristics of the firm.  Section 7 examines the interactions between 
mutual monitoring capacity and incentives.  Section 8 studies the effects 
of mutual monitoring on firm investment policy, specifically whether mutual 
monitoring affects the CEO’s propensity to choose policies that promote 
empire building or the quiet life.  Section 9 addresses endogeneity 
                                            
10 See the optimal contracting literature, e.g., Demstez and Lehn (1985) 
and Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke (2011), for equilibrium explanations. 
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concerns, and Section 10 discusses alternative explanations.  Section 11 
concludes. 
DATA SOURCE 
I construct my sample with firms that comprise the ExecuComp 
database for the years 1993–2006.  The database contains details of top 
executives at each of the firms in the S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, and S&P 
Smallcap 600.  Because federal reporting requirements have been 
enhanced since December 15, 1992, the data for 1993–2006 are virtually 
complete.  Firm financial data are from COMPUSTAT, governance-related 
data are from the IRRC database, and merger and acquisition data are 
from SDC database.  Refer to Appendix 1 for a detailed description of 
each variable used in this paper. 
THE NO. 2 EXECUTIVE 
 I define “CEO” using ExecuComp’s annual CEO flag which 
identifies the executive who was the CEO for the majority of the fiscal 
year.  The CEO usually has the highest total compensation among all the 
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executives in the firm.  The No. 2 executive is defined as the highest paid 
non-CEO executive in each firm year.11 
In Table 1, I classify the No. 2 executives by their reported job titles 
in order to identify the functional backgrounds of the executives.  No. 2s 
have varying titles, with 35.36% holding the title of Vice President (VP), 
25.86% President, 19.34% Chief Operating Officer (COO), 11.05% Chief 
Finance Officer (CFO), and 8.39% others such as Treasurer, Director, 
Secretary, Counsel, Chief Technology Officer, Chief Information Officer, 
etc.  On average, each No. 2 executive has 1.46 titles.  The most common 
combinations include VP & COO and VP & CFO.  
 
 
Table 1 
Reported Job Titles of the No. 2 Executives  
 
Job Title Number of Observations Percent of Total 
Vice President 10,108 35.36% 
President 7,394 25.86% 
COO 5,528 19.34% 
CFO 3,159 11.05% 
Others 2,399 8.39% 
Sum 28,588 100% 
 
                                            
11 If a CEO, whether incoming or outgoing, serves for a partial year, her 
compensation is very likely not the highest in that firm year. I delete these 
observations.  I also exclude special cases such as firms with co-CEOs, 
interim CEOs, missing CEOs, etc.  After such screenings, I still find about 
5% of times that the CEO’s pay is not the highest in the firm.  Because 
these cases defeat the purpose of using pay gap to capture the bottom-up 
monitoring system, I exclude them.  Nonetheless, including all these cases 
of a negative GAP does not significantly change the empirical results 
reported below. 
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Note. This table provides summary statistics for the No. 2s’ composition 
based on reported job titles in ExecuComp using cross-sectional yearly 
data from 1993 to 2006. There are 19,580 observations and 28,588 titles, 
i.e. 1.46 titles per executive on average.  
I further examine the characteristics of the No. 2s.  Because CEOs 
receive much more scrutiny and their characteristics are better known, for 
context, I compare CEOs and No. 2s along numerous dimensions.  Table 
2 shows that the No. 2s are notably different from the CEOs with respect 
to age, gender, board membership, compensation, pay performance 
sensitivity, etc.  On average, No. 2s, as compared to the CEOs, are 
younger (age 52.7 vs. 55.6) with shorter tenure in the company (9.5 vs. 
16.5), more likely to be female (4% vs. 1%), and less likely to be on the 
board (43% vs. 100%).  They earn less ($3 million vs. $5 million) and own 
less of the firms (0.6% vs. 2.7%).  As for wealth-performance sensitivity 
(WPS), No. 2 wealth is much less sensitive to shareholder wealth changes 
than is CEO wealth ($12 vs. $39 per thousand $ change in shareholder 
wealth).  The percentage difference between the CEO and second-in-
command in total compensation (43.36%) is smaller than in WPS 
(64.67%).  (Refer to Appendix 2 for a detailed calculation of WPS.)  Panel 
C shows that 43% of the No. 2 executives are board members of their 
firms, 30% hold the title of President, and 55% joined the firms before the 
CEOs. 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
    
Panel A: Characteristics of No. 2 and CEO     
         
   Mean Median Standard Deviation 
  Units No. 2 CEO No. 2 CEO No. 2 CEO 
Age Years 52.66 55.60 52.00 56.00 8.34 7.58 
Female  Y1/N0 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.11 
Director  Y1/N0 0.43 0.99 0.00 1.00 0.49 0.10 
Tenure Years 9.50 16.51 5.00 14.00 10.69 12.20 
Salary $1000 460.51 731.19 396.84 668.75 281.88 397.57 
Bonus $1000 480.66 806.99 216.84 389.39 1,509.18 1,891.16 
Stock Grant $1000 353.33 544.70 0.00 0.00 3,150.84 5,942.13 
Option Awards $1000 1,600.23 2,617.51 436.08 657.35 5,711.26 10,507.63
Total 
Compensation $1000 3,270.14 5,349.48 1,579.52 2,507.48 7,376.04 19,788.74
Ownership % 0.59 2.71 0.06 0.34 2.76 6.55 
WPS 
per 
$1000 11.55 38.95 4.74 15.79 29.35 67.83 
 
 
Panel B: Gaps between No. 2 and CEO 
 
  Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile
Gap of Total Compensation (%) 43.36 43.98 22.36 27.03 59.40 
Gap of WPS (%) 64.67 69.05 25.09 49.04 84.60 
 
 
Panel C: Three Additional Proxies for Monitoring from No. 2 
 
  Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
25th 
Percentile
75th 
Percentile 
Director-No. 2 0.43 0.00 0.51 0.00 1.00 
President-No. 2 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Independent-No. 2 0.55 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
 
Note. This table provides summary statistics for the No. 2s’ characteristics 
as compared to the CEOs’ using cross-sectional yearly data from 1993 to 
2006. Among the variables, Female is a dummy variable with 1 for female 
and 0 for male, Director is a dummy variable with 1 if the executive serves 
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as a director during the fiscal year and 0 otherwise, Tenure is years in 
company, Total compensation includes salary, bonus, other annual, 
restricted stock grants, long-term incentive plan payouts, all other, and 
value of option grants, and Ownership is total shares owned % excluding 
options. WPS is wealth for performance sensitivity, defined by Jensen and 
Murphy (1990b) as the change in total compensation per thousand dollar 
change in shareholder wealth. The gap of total compensation is calculated 
as (CEO’s pay-No. 2’s pay)/CEO’s pay.  The gap of WPS is defined as 
(CEO’s WPS-No. 2’s WPS)/CEO’s WPS.  Director-No. 2 is a dummy, with 
1 for No. 2 is a board director, 0 for not. President-No. 2 is a dummy, with 
1 for No. 2 is the president of the company, 0 for not.  Independent-No. 2 
is a dummy, with 1 for No. 2 joined the company before the CEO, 0 for 
not.   
The characteristics and compensation of the No. 2 executives vary 
significantly both over time and across industries.  Figure 1 reveals 
several trends.  For example, the percentage of No. 2s that is female 
increases more rapidly than that of the CEOs during the sample period.  In 
1993, there were hardly any female CEOs and only 1% female No. 2s.  In 
2006, about 6% of No. 2s were female.  While almost all the CEOs were 
board members, the No. 2s have been less and less likely to serve on the 
board.  The percentage drops from 60% to 20%, with a dramatic and 
persistent trend.  The reason, in part, is likely to be recently adopted listing 
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requirements and other recent pressures to increase board independence 
and reduce board size.  In some cases these forces mean reducing the 
number of employees on the board of directors.  As Figure 2 depicts, there 
is an increasing trend in the pay GAP: the gap between CEOs and the No. 
2s increases from 40% of CEO pay to 60% over the sample period.  
 
Age
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Figure 1. Annual Trends of Characteristics: No. 2 vs. CEO 
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Note. This panel uses cross-sectional yearly data from 1993 to 2006. 
Among the variables, Female is a dummy variable = 1 for female and 0 for 
male, Board Member is a dummy variable = 1 if the executive serves as a 
director in the firm and 0 if not.  
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Figure 2. Annual Trends of Compensation (level and structure) 
            
Note. This panel provides summary statistics for the No. 2s’ median 
compensation as compared to the CEOs’ using cross-sectional yearly 
data from 1993 to 2006. The left bars are the No. 2’s compensation, and 
the right bars the CEO’s. Among the variables, Stock is restricted stock 
grants in each year; Option is option awards in each year valued by the 
Black-Scholes model. All the numbers are in thousands of 2006 dollars. 
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DETERMINANTS OF MUTUAL MONITORING 
DETERMININANTS OF THE GAP 
The relation between CEO compensation (level, structure, etc.) and 
its economic determinants has been extensively documented (e.g., Bizjak, 
Brickley, and Coles, 1993; Murphy, 1999; Core and Guay, 1999; Hermalin 
and Wallace, 2001; Coles and Li, 2010).  Recent papers (e.g., Frydman 
and Saks, 2010; Bebchuk et al., 2011) study pay dispersion among the 
top 5 executives.  Nonetheless, the compensation gap between the CEO 
and the No. 2 executive has received little direct attention, despite the 
likelihood that the balance of authority and decision rights between the 
CEO and the No. 2 executive is central for performance and value, 
perhaps more central than the balance between the CEO and executives 
lower in the organization.  
I use the following regression to study the determinants of the GAP: 
 
    GAPi,t+1 = α + Xit β + Yit γ + Zit δ + θi + μt + εit 
 
where GAPi,t+1 depends on: executive characteristics, Xit, board structure, 
Yit, firm characteristics, Zit, for firm i in year t; firm fixed effects, θi; and time 
effects, μt.  I use lagged independent variables because many of them are 
year-end data while the GAP is largely determined at year beginning.  
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Another reason is that the specification is meant to capture factors that 
lead to subsequent changes in the GAP. 
I use year dummies to account for time varying changes that are 
common to all the companies.  I use firm dummies to control for 
unobservable time-invariant firm characteristics.  In some cases, I control 
for industry, according to 4-digit SIC code, with industry dummies to 
capture industry variation.  To adjust for potential heteroskedasticity and 
within-firm correlation, I report standard errors clustered by firm. 
Table 3 presents the results on the determinants, grouped by class 
of variable, of the GAP.  The three specifications vary only in the fixed 
effects employed. 
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Table 3 
Determinants of GAP 
 
Panel A: Determinants of GAP  
 
 
Dependent Variable: GAPt+1 
     
  
Predicted 
Sign (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Director-No. 2 - -6.64***  -5.76***  -3.09*** 
   (0.41)  (0.42)  (0.47) 
President-No. 2 - -8.54***  -8.01***  -7.27*** 
  (0.42)  (0.43)  (0.49) 
Independent-No. 2 - -1.70**  -1.55*  -1.39 
  (0.82)  (0.83)  (1.08) 
Age Difference + 0.06***  0.05**  0.06*** 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
CEO Pay + 0.25***  0.26***  0.21*** 
E
xe
cu
tiv
e 
In
fo
 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Board 
Independence ? 3.77***  2.62**  0.92 
  (1.10)  (1.14)  (1.31) 
Institutional 
Holdings ? 5.42  3.89  3.90 
  (10.66)  (10.65)  (10.48) 
Board Size ? -0.12**  -0.11  -0.06 
  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.09) 
Classified Board ? -0.14  0.30  -0.16 
  (0.47)  (0.50)  (0.94) 
G-Index ? 0.37***  0.25***  0.22 
G
ov
er
na
nc
e 
M
ea
su
re
 
   (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.17) 
Qt + 0.50***  0.48***  0.32*** 
  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.09) 
Firm Volatility + 0.83  2.47***  2.21* 
  (0.69)  (0.85)  (1.18) 
Firm Size + 4.41***  4.32***  3.13*** 
  (0.58)  (0.63)  (1.26) 
Firm Size Squared - -0.26***  -0.25***  -0.23*** 
   (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.09) 
Fi
rm
 C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
 
       
        
 Fixed Effects  Year  Year+Industry  Year+Firm 
        
 Observations  16,150  16,150  16,150 
        
  Adjusted R2  0.09  0.15  0.40 
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Panel B: Governance Measures and GAP  
 
Dependent Variable: GAPt+1     
      
  
Substitution
Hypothesis
Complement
Hypothesis (1) (2) (3) 
Board 
Independence + - 9.68*** 6.97*** 2.35* 
   (1.09) (1.14) (1.32) 
Institutional Holdings + - -4.66 2.62 0.52 
   (10.87) (10.84) (10.57) 
Board Size - + -0.57*** -0.43*** -0.17* 
   (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) 
Classified Board - + -0.11 0.56 -0.31 
   (0.48) (0.51) (0.95) 
G-Index - + 0.10 -0.01 -0.14 
    (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) 
        
Fixed Effects   Year Year+Industry  Year+Firm 
        
Observations   16,150       16,150   16,150 
        
Adjusted R2   0.03         0.10   0.40 
 
 
Note. The table shows OLS regressions of GAPi,t+1 = a + bXit + cYit + 
dZit + (year dummies) + (industry dummies) + (firm dummies) + eit using 
cross-sectional yearly data from 1993 to 2006. The dependent is GAP*100 
where GAP = (CEO’s total compensation – No. 2’s total compensation) ÷ 
CEO’s total compensation.  In Panel A, independent variables include 
Director-No. 2, President-No. 2, Independent-No. 2, Age Difference, CEO 
Pay, Board Independence, Institutional Holdings, Board Size, Classified 
Board, G-Index, CEO Pay, Q, Firm Volatility, Firm Size, Firm Size 
Squared. In Panel B, independent variables include Board Independence, 
Institutional Holdings, Board Size, Classified Board, G-Index, Q, Firm 
Size, and Firm Size Squared. Director-No. 2 is a dummy, with 1 for No. 2 
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is a board director, 0 for not. President-No. 2 is a dummy, with 1 for No. 2 
is the president of the company, 0 for not.  Independent-No. 2 is a dummy, 
with 1 for No. 2 joined the company before the CEO, 0 for not. All other 
control variables are defined in Appendix A. Year dummies are created for 
years 1993–2006. Industry dummies are based on the firm’s four-digit SIC 
code. Firm dummies are based on firm’s GVKEY identifier in Compustat. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and presented in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Managerial Attributes: 
Among all right-hand side variables, regardless of which fixed 
effects are included, executive characteristics have the highest 
explanatory power.  All of them are related to the GAP at the 5% level of 
significance or better.  The coefficients on Director-No. 2 are all significant 
and negative.  Although the CEOs are usually board members, the No. 2s 
rarely are.  If a No. 2 is also on the board, that status suggests that she is 
powerful and has channels to the board that do not go through the CEO, 
so the GAP is smaller.  Similarly, when the No. 2 is the president or joined 
the firm before the CEO, such status reflects her authority, influence, and 
independence in the firm.  
Firm Characteristics: 
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As Panel A of Table 3 indicates, firm specific characteristics are 
associated with the GAP.  For example, Tobin’s Q in year t Qt, is strongly 
and positively related to the GAP.  Past firm performance, if good, rewards 
and empowers the CEO more than the No. 2s.  Firm volatility in period t is 
positively related to GAP.  On one hand, an imperial CEO with less 
monitoring may increase firm volatility.  On the other hand, a volatile firm 
would prefer to give the CEO more discretion especially when facing crisis 
and turnaround situations. Firm size is significantly and positively related, 
and the relationship is concave.  The CEO requires more discretion to 
manage a larger, more complex, company. 
Governance Measures: 
Supposing that the array of governance mechanisms is chosen 
jointly to maximize value, I examine empirically the relation among those 
mechanisms.  Of course, my focus is on mutual monitoring from the No. 2 
executive.  Is such mutual monitoring a substitute or complement relative 
to other aspects of governance?  If a firm has strong monitoring from an 
independent board, for example, is mutual monitoring necessary?  Or 
perhaps an independent board will view mutual monitoring as an important 
device to supplement board monitoring.  If a firm has weak governance, 
for instance, the board cannot closely monitor the CEO or the costs of 
direct monitoring outweigh the benefits, perhaps a powerful second-in-
command will be particularly valuable.  On the contrary, if a firm has 
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sufficient governance, a powerful No. 2 might lead to over-monitoring and 
inefficiency.  In the specification in the last column of Table 3 Panel A, the 
coefficients of the governance measures are often not significant.  Of 
course, the likely reason is that this specification includes firm fixed effects 
and governance measures, such as board size and classified board, 
which do not vary much over time, as compared to other variables in the 
regression.12  In the specifications that do not include firm fixed effects, 
the coefficients on board independence and G-Index are significantly 
positive.  The GAP is larger when the board is more independent and 
when the firm has more takeover barriers in place.  A second approach is 
to include slowly changing variables only.  Controlling only for Q, firm size, 
and firm size squared, Panel B of Table 3 confirms the result for board 
independence, but not for the G-index, and finds that the GAP and board 
size are negatively related.  Overall, these results support the substitution 
hypothesis.  The GAP is significantly and positively correlated with board 
independence, and significantly and negatively correlated with board size.  
Notably, the results are inconsistent with CEO entrenchment story which 
suggests both poor governance and corresponding large pay gap. 
DETERMININANTS OF THE OTHER MEASURES  
                                            
12 As Zhou (2001) points out, if explanatory variables change slowly over 
time, firm fixed-effect regressions may fail to detect relations in the data 
even when they exist.   
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Table 4 examines whether each of the other three measures of 
mutual monitoring are related to other governance attributes.  Panel A 
considers the indicator variable for whether the second-in-command holds 
a seat on the board of directors.  Panel B examines the correlates of 
whether the No. 2 holds the title of president, while Panel C considers the 
correlates of whether the No. 2 executive joined the firm prior to the CEO. 
 
Table 4 
Governance Measures and Three Additional Proxies 
 
Panel A: Governance Measures and Director-No. 2  
 
Dependent Variable: Director-No. 2 t+1    
      
  
Substitution
Hypothesis
Complement
Hypothesis (1) (2) (3) 
Board Independence - + -2.25*** -2.65*** -1.79*** 
   (0.11) (0.04) (0.18) 
Institutional Holdings - + 0.18* 0.07 0.12 
   (0.11) (0.05) (0.09) 
Board Size + - 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.06*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Classified Board + - 0.02 -0.03 0.14 
   (0.05) (0.05) (0.13) 
G-Index + - 0.00 0.02*** -0.02 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
      
Fixed Effects   Year Year+Industry Year+Firm
      
Observations   16,057 16,057 16,057 
      
Pseudo R2   0.08 0.15 0.41 
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Panel B: Governance Measures and President-No. 2  
 
Dependent Variable: President-No. 2 t+1    
      
  
Substitution
Hypothesis
Complement
Hypothesis (1) (2) (3) 
Board Independence - + -0.48*** -0.66*** -0.53*** 
   (0.10) (0.15) (0.16) 
Institutional Holdings - + -0.16 -0.14* -0.14* 
   (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) 
Board Size + - 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.01 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Classified Board + - 0.02 -0.01 0.21* 
   (0.05) (0.05) (0.12) 
G-Index + - -0.00 0.01* -0.02 
    (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) 
      
Fixed Effects   Year Year+Industry Year+Firm
      
Observations   17,925 17,925 17,925 
      
Pseudo R2   0.02 0.10 0.41 
 
Panel C: Governance Measures and Independent-No. 2  
 
Dependent Variable: Independent-No. 2 t+1    
      
  
Substitution
Hypothesis
Complement
Hypothesis (1) (2) (3) 
Board Independence - + -0.25* -0.40** -1.07*** 
   (0.17) (0.20) (0.37) 
Institutional Holdings - + 0.07 0.37 -0.74*** 
   (0.17) (0.26) (0.20) 
Board Size + - 0.01 0.05*** 0.00 
   (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Classified Board + - 0.02 -0.10 -0.14 
   (0.08) (0.12) (0.28) 
G-Index + - -0.02 -0.01 0.08*** 
    (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
      
Fixed Effects   Year Year+Industry Year+Firm 
      
Observations   5,971 5,971 5,971 
      
Pseudo R2   0.05 0.16 0.39 
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Note. The table shows logistic regressions of three additional proxies for 
No. 2’s monitoring capacity on governance measures using cross-
sectional yearly data from 1993 to 2006. The dependent variables are 
Director-No. 2 in Panel A, President-No. 2 in Panel B, and Independent-
No. 2 in Panel C. Independent variables, which are the same in each 
panel, include Board Independence, Institutional Holdings, Board Size, 
Classified Board, G-Index, Q, Firm Size, and Firm Size Squared. Director-
No. 2 is a dummy, with 1 for No. 2 is a board director, 0 for not. President-
No. 2 is a dummy, with 1 for No. 2 is the president of the company, 0 for 
not.  Independent-No. 2 is a dummy, with 1 for No. 2 joined the company 
before the CEO, 0 for not. All other control variables are defined in 
Appendix A.  Year dummies are created for years 1993–2006. Industry 
dummies are based on the firm’s four-digit SIC code. Firm dummies are 
based on firm’s GVKEY identifier in Compustat. R2 is log-likelihood based 
pseudo R2. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and presented 
in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
The results in Table 4 suggest that weaker boards, e.g., less 
independent or larger boards, tend to confer more authority, more decision 
rights, and better access to information on the second-in-command, again 
supporting the substitution hypothesis.   
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I now turn to the primary focus of the analysis.  The sections below 
measure the extent to which mutual monitoring affects firm performance 
and investment policy. 
MUTUAL MONITORING AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
HYPOTHESIS 
In terms of prior literature, the optimal contracting hypothesis (e.g., 
Holmstrom, 1979; Grossman and Hart, 1983) contends that boards of 
directors bargain at arm’s length as shareholders’ loyal agents, and 
minimize agency costs and maximize firm value by optimally assigning 
executives with incentives and responsibility.  It implies optimal monitoring 
from the No. 2 executive and needs not imply a systematic relationship 
between mutual monitoring and firm performance.   
In contrast, the managerial power hypothesis (e.g., Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 1999; Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002) argues that 
boards do not always bargain at arm’s length and therefore are not able to 
construct an optimal monitoring system.  In particular, they suggest that 
the CEO has so much power and authority, as compared to the No. 2s, 
that the extent of mutual monitoring is insufficient to constrain the powerful 
CEO.  Under this view, stronger mutual monitoring is likely to be 
associated with better firm performance because the extent of mutual 
monitoring in place is less than optimal.  Thus, for example, as the GAP 
becomes larger firm value or performance would decline.  Likewise, when 
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one or more of my other three variables indicates more mutual monitoring, 
firm performance would increase.   
Tournament theory (e.g., Lazear and Rosen, 1981), on the other 
hand, suggests an opposing effect from the GAP.  If a big raise is the 
tournament prize to advancing to the CEO position, executives who are 
not CEO have a large incentive to provide managerial input that advances 
firm performance.  Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran (2009) provide 
evidence that the difference between CEO compensation and 
compensation of lower executives is positively related to firm 
performance.13   
Ultimately, assessing which theory dominates is an empirical 
question.  While research focuses intensively on formal mechanisms, such 
as compensation incentives designed to “pull” the executives to work and 
board monitoring designed to “push” executives to work, with the 
exception of a few contributions listed above there is little evidence on the 
effects of the internal allocation of authority and information.14  My 
hypothesis is that a well-structured authority system, by imbuing 
                                            
13 There are two major differences between the experiments in Kale et al 
(2009) and those in this section.  First, they use pay gap between the 
CEO and median pay of all the VPs, while I use top 2 executives.  
Second, they use contemporaneous Q on the LHS, and I use 1 year 
forward Q.  Since I have shown past firm performance is an important 
determinant of pay gap, using contemporaneous Q might have reverse 
causality issues. 
14 An exception is Acharya et al. (2011), which provides a model of 
“internal governance” where subordinates may limit the CEO’s self-serving 
actions. 
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executives with appropriate incentives and distributing power, information, 
and responsibility in a fashion that balances costs and benefits, potentially 
results in better firm performance.  I state my specific hypothesis as 
follows.   
Hypothesis 1: The extent of mutual monitoring is positively related 
to firm performance.  In particular, GAP is negatively related to firm 
performance.  The No. 2 executive holding a board seat, holding the title 
of president, and being appointed prior to the CEO are positively 
associated with firm performance. 
Below I provide what to my knowledge is the first empirical 
evidence on the relationship between mutual monitoring and firm 
performance.     
EVIDENCE  
Following prior literature (e.g.; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; 
Bebchuk et al., 2011), I use Tobin’s Q in year t+1 as a proxy for future firm 
performance.  Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm to 
the replacement value of the firm’s asset.  To explain Qt+1, I control for a 
variety of variables that are suggested by theoretical and empirical 
literature.  In particular, control variables commonly used in performance 
equations include research and development expenses, advertising 
expenses, capital intensity, treasury stock, board size, institutional 
holdings (Palia, 2001), earnings before extraordinary items, the natural 
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logarithm of net assets (as a proxy for firm size), the square of the log of 
net assets, interest expense, common dividends, new financing, property 
plant equipment (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007), percent of independent 
directors, G Index, CEO total compensation, whether the firm has a 
classified board, return on assets, return on sales, leverage, firm volatility, 
and a Delaware company dummy (Faleye, 2007).  I also include 
combinations of year, industry, and firm fixed effects, the last to control for 
unobservable firm characteristics. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, Table 5 Panel A, a simple OLS, 
reports a negative relation between Tobin’s Q in period t+1 and the GAP 
in period t.  Panel A also suggests that the No. 2 executive being a 
director of the company or president or being “independent” benefits the 
firm through increased future value.   
Notably, while controlling for board independence (% of outside 
directors) so that the well-studied relation between board independence 
and performance is held constant, the Director-No. 2 dummy is still 
positively associated with performance.  This suggests that the No. 2, as a 
board member, can monitor better than an arbitrary inside director.   
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Table 5 
 Mutual Monitoring and Firm Performance 
 
 
Panel A: Year and Industry Fixed Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: Q t+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GAP -0.06* -0.09*       
 0.04 0.05       
         
Director-No. 2   0.02 0.04*     
   0.02 0.02     
         
President-No. 2     0.09*** 0.08***   
     0.03 0.03   
         
Independent-No. 2       0.07 0.12* 
       0.06 0.06 
         
Fixed Effect Year Yr+Ind Year Yr+Ind Year Yr+Ind Year Yr+Ind 
         
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
         
Observations 18,873 18,873 18,873 18,873 18,873 18,873 4,551 4,551 
         
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.25 0.17 0.26 0.18 0.28 0.16 0.25 
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Panel B: Firm Fixed Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: Q t+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GAP -0.10* -0.11*       
 0.06 0.06       
         
Director-No. 2   0.04* 0.05**     
   0.02 0.02     
         
President-No. 2     0.04* 0.06**   
     0.02 0.02   
         
Independent-No. 2       0.15** 0.12*
       0.07 0.07
         
Year + Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Control Variables Y N Y N Y N Y N 
         
Observations 18,873 19,019 18,873 19,019 18,873 19,019 4,551 4,551
         
Adjusted R2 0.53 0.48 0.51 0.48 0.52 0.48 0.46 0.43
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Panel C: Controlling for Qt 
 
Dependent Variable: Q t+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GAP -0.14** -0.13**       
 0.06 0.06       
         
Director-No. 2   0.03 0.05*     
   0.02 0.03     
         
President-No. 2     0.05** 0.07***   
     0.02 0.02   
         
Independent-No. 2       0.04 0.21*** 
       0.05 0.08 
         
Q t 0.34*** 0.20*** 0.34*** 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.30*** 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
         
Fixed Effect Year Yr+Ind Year Yr+Ind Year Yr+Ind Year Yr+Ind 
         
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
         
Observations 18,873 18,873 18,873 18,873 18,873 18,873 4,551 4,551 
         
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.40 0.33 0.40 0.33 0.41 0.32 0.38 
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Panel D: First-Differences Model 
 
Dependent Variable: ∆Q t+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
∆GAP -0.13* -0.13*       
 0.07 0.07       
         
∆Director-No. 2   0.08** 0.08**     
   0.04 0.04     
         
∆President-No. 2     0.01 0.01   
     0.04 0.04   
         
∆Independent-No. 2       0.32** 0.32** 
       0.15 0.15 
         
Fixed Effect Year Yr+Ind Year Yr+Ind Year Yr+Ind Year Yr+Ind 
         
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
         
Observations 15,888 15,888 14,210 14,210 15,724 15,724 3,082 3,082 
         
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
 
 
 
Panel E: Industry-Adjusted Model 
 
Dependent Variable: Ind-adj Q t+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ind-adj GAP -0.09*    
 0.05    
     
Ind-adj Director-No. 2  0.06***   
  0.02   
     
Ind-adj President-No. 2   0.07***  
   0.03  
     
Ind-adj Independent-No. 2    0.12* 
    0.07 
     
Fixed Effect Year+Firm Year+Firm Year+Firm Year+Firm 
     
Control Variables Y Y Y Y 
     
Observations 18,873 18,873 18,873 4,551 
     
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.37 
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Panel F: Q t+3 
 
Dependent Variable: Q t+3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GAP -0.09* -0.11**       
 0.05 0.05       
         
Director-No. 2   0.05** 0.05**     
   0.02 0.02     
         
President-No. 2     0.04* 0.05**   
     0.02 0.02   
         
Independent-No. 2       -0.07 -0.03 
       0.06 0.06 
         
Q t 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
         
Fixed Effect Year Yr+Ind Year Yr+Ind Year Yr+Ind Year Yr+Ind 
         
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
         
Observations 13,220 13,220 13,220 13,220 13,147 13,147 3,238 3,238 
         
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.31 0.24 0.31 0.24 0.32 0.23 0.31 
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Panel G: Q t+5 
 
Dependent Variable: Q t+5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GAP -0.06 -0.04       
 0.06 0.06       
         
Director-No. 2   0.05* 0.06**     
   0.03 0.03     
         
President-No. 2     0.05 0.06*   
     0.03 0.03   
         
Independent-No. 2       -0.09 -0.08 
       0.08 0.08 
         
Q t 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.04***
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
         
Fixed Effect Year Yr+Ind Year Yr+Ind Year Yr+Ind Year Yr+Ind
         
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
         
Observations 9,476 9,476 9,476 9,476 9,418 9,418 2,280 2,280
         
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.28 0.20 0.28 0.20 0.29 0.20 0.28 
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Panel H: 2SLS 
 
Dependent Variable: Q t+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GAP -0.17*    
 0.09    
     
Director-No. 2  0.16**   
  0.08   
     
President-No. 2   0.05*  
   0.03  
     
Independent-No. 2    0.17 
    0.10 
     
Fixed Effect Year+Ind Year+Ind Year+Ind Year+Ind 
     
Control Variables Y Y Y Y 
     
Observations 7,014 6,897 8,478 1,871 
     
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.22 
F stat 16.44*** 26.77*** 29.67*** 21.13*** 
p (Sargan test)  0.25 0.48 0.33 0.35 
p (Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test) 0.28 0.18 0.21 0.28 
 
 
Note. The table shows regressions for the cross-sectional yearly data from 
1993 to 2006. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. The independent 
variables include GAP, Director-No. 2, President-No. 2, Independent-No. 
2. Director-No. 2 is a dummy, with 1 for No. 2 is a board director, 0 for not. 
President-No. 2 is a dummy, with 1 for No. 2 is the president of the 
company, 0 for not.  Independent-No. 2 is a dummy, with 1 for No. 2 
joined the company before the CEO, 0 for not. Control variables are Age 
Difference, CEO Pay, Board size, Institutional Holdings, Board 
Independence, G Index, Classified Board, Firm volatility, Firm size, Firm 
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Size squared, Stock Ret 3yr, R&D, Advertising, Interest, New Finance, 
Capital Intensity, PPE, CEO WPS, Leverage, Earnings, Treasury Stock, 
ROA, ROS, Delaware, and Year dummies. All the variables are defined in 
Appendix A. In industry fixed effect model in Panel A, industry dummies 
are based on the firm’s four-digit SIC code. Panels B, C, D, E, F and G are 
robustness checks. In firm fixed effect model in Panel B, firm dummies are 
based on firm’s GVKEY in Compustat. In columns 2, 4, 6, and 8, only Qt, 
firm size, and firm size squared are controlled for. Panel C controls for 
past firm performance Qt. Panel D uses first-differences model. Panel E 
uses industry-adjusted method. The dependent variables are Qt+3 and Qt+5 
in Panel F and G, respectively. Panel H reports the second stage results 
of 2SLS estimates with industry median measures and 5 year lagged 
measures as instrumental variables. Panel Standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level, and presented in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Conferring the title of president on the second-in-command is 
positively related to future value.  This result is consistent with the notion 
that titles are associated with formal authority and informal influence and 
that such enhance firm value by enabling effective monitoring of the CEO 
by the No. 2 executive.  Likewise, the positive coefficient on the 
independent No. 2 indicator suggests that a No. 2 who was appointed 
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prior to the CEO is less co-opted by the CEO and, thus, is better able to 
serve in the capacity of mutual monitor. 
ROBUSTNESS 
The above empirical results are robust to adding or dropping any 
control variable.  In addition, I obtain similar results using firm fixed effect 
model in Table 5 Panel B which mitigates omitted variable problem by 
controlling for unobserved time-invariant firm specific information.   
In Panel C, I control for Qt and show that based on past 
performance Qt, mutual monitoring within a firm provides incremental 
explanatory power to account for future firm performance Qt+1.  
In Panel D, I further study within-firm variation and show similar 
results by regressing changes in performance on changes in mutual 
monitoring measures in the first differences model.  
In Panel E, following Bebchuk et al. (2011), I use industry-adjusted 
performance and industry-adjusted measures.  Results are still robust.  
Furthermore, I regress 3 year forward Qt+3 and 5 year forward Qt+5 
on the four measures in Panels F and G, respectively.  The results are 
similar except that the coefficients for t+5 are rarely significant.  Mutual 
monitoring may have a moderately long term effect on firm performance.   
In Panel H, I use 2SLS approach with industry median measure 
and five year lagged measure as instrumental variables to my four 
measures.  Industry median measures of mutual monitoring are related to 
42 
 
 
 
 
the measures in the firm.  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that 
organizations tend to be similar by adopting similar organizational 
practices through institutional isomorphism.  Therefore it’s reasonable to 
expect the mutual monitoring structure of industry peers has a positive 
influence on a focal firm. On the other hand, for example, whether a No. 2 
is the president in an industry median firm should have no direct impact on 
a focal firm’s performance (after adjusting for industry and year fixed 
effects).15  The second instrument is five year lagged measure. It is a 
commonly used approach to the choice of instruments in time series or 
panel data (Greene, 2000; Kennedy, 2003). By construction, this lagged 
measure is related to contemporaneous measure but has no or less direct 
effect on firm performance.  I also statistically test the instruments for their 
relevance and validity.  The first-stage F statistics all surpass the usual 
rule of thumb of 10, the over-identification test (Sargan’s test) can’t reject 
the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid and orthogonal to the 
regression residuals, and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test cannot reject 
exogeneity of all four measures in this model, suggesting these measures 
can be treated as largely exogenous under the usual analysis of 
instrumental variables and therefore OLS might be more efficient than 
                                            
15 With industry and year fixed effects, the estimation of the coefficients on 
the endogenous variables is based on the time series and cross-sectional 
variation of the industry median instruments. Several recent studies 
employ the same approach to construct instrument (e.g., John and 
Kadyrzhanova, 2008; Bebchuk et al., 2011; Kini and Williams, 2012). 
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2SLS in this case.  Indeed the results from the second stage of 2SLS, as 
shown in Panel H, are similar to those from the OLS regressions. 
Across the variety of different specifications, the coefficients on 
GAP are about -0.11.  For a one-standard-deviation decrease in the GAP 
(from median 44% to 22%), forward Tobin’s Q increases from median 1.48 
to 1.50 and firm value increases from median $1.39 billion to $1.41 billion. 
A HORSE RACE 
The CEO pay slice measure (Bebchuk et al., 2011) and my 
measure, the GAP, are somewhat similar in intent and functional form.  
CEO Pay Slice (CPS) is CEO total compensation divided by the total 
compensation paid to the top 5 executives.  In Table 6, I compare the 
explanatory power of GAP and CPS.  Excluding the GAP as a regressor, 
the significant effects of CPS on Q are mostly similar to those in Bebchuk 
et al. (2011).  The inclusion of the GAP, however, largely reduces the 
economic and statistical significance of the CPS.  The GAP has more 
statistical power than CPS in most of the specifications.  Moreover, based 
on a normalized comparison, the economic magnitude of the “GAP effect” 
is approximately double the “CPS effect” on average.16  Perhaps the 
                                            
16 For example, assume a 10% raise on average CEO pay from $5 million 
to $5.5 million. The GAP increases by 0.05 from mean 43% to 48%, and 
the CPS by 0.02 from mean 34% to 36%. Then considering the 
coefficients in Table 7, the economic significance of the GAP doubles that 
of the CPS on average. 
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authority and access to information is significantly higher for No. 2 
executives than for executives lower in the organizational hierarchy. 
  
 
Table 6 
Horse Race: GAP vs. CPS 
 
Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q  Industry-adjusted Tobin's Q  Ind-adj Tobin's Q (controlling for lagged Q) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
CPS -0.18** -0.14    -0.34*** -0.28***    -0.25** -0.18   
 (0.09) (0.09)    (0.11) (0.11)    (0.11) (0.13)   
GAP  -0.10*     -0.16***     -0.07   
  (0.05)     (0.06)     (0.06)   
               
Ind-adj CPS   -0.10 -0.06    -0.32*** -0.24**    -0.27** -0.14 
   (0.09) (0.08)    (0.11) (0.12)    (0.12) (0.14) 
Ind-adj GAP    -0.09*     -0.21***     -0.13* 
    (0.05)     (0.07)     (0.07) 
               
Observations 12,151 12,151 11,963 11,963  12,139 12,139 12,139 12,139  13,775 13,775 13,775 13,775 
               
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.47  0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10  0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 
 
Note. The table shows OLS regressions for the cross-sectional yearly data from 1993 to 2006. All specifications include 
year dummies. In specifications 1 2 3 and 4, the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q in the following year. Year and firm fixed 
effects are included. In 5 6 7 and 8, the dependent variable is industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q in the following year. Year fixed 
effects are included. In 9 10 11 and 12, the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q in the following year while controlling for 
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Tobin’s Q in the current year. Year fixed effects are included. The explanatory variable GAP = (CEO’s total compensation 
– No. 2’s total compensation) ÷ CEO’s total compensation. CPS is the CEO’s Pay Slice, calculated as the CEO’s total 
compensation divided by the total pay to the top 5 executives. Control variables include Age Difference, CEO Pay, G 
Index, Classified Board, Board size, Institutional Holdings, Board Independence, Firm volatility, Firm size, Firm Size 
squared, Stock Ret 3yr, R&D, Advertising, Interest, New Finance, Capital, PPE, CEO WPS, Leverage, Earnings, Treasury 
Stock, ROA, ROS, Delaware, and Year dummies. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. Industry-adjusted method is 
based on the firm’s four-digit SIC code. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and presented in parenthesis. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
46 
 47 
 
FURTHER DISCUSSTION 
All the previous results seem to support that mutual monitoring by a 
No. 2 executive is likely to be weaker than would be ideal so that stronger 
mutual monitoring is associated with increased performance.  
Nonetheless, there are potential concerns with this interpretation. 
The dollar gain to a one-standard deviation reduction in GAP is 
consequential.  The question is why that $20 million potential gain to the 
shareholders is observable in data.  One possibility is the standard sort of 
transaction cost argument.  Any potential gain to increased mutual 
monitoring would be offset or outweighed by the various transaction costs 
of the corresponding organizational change, with the result that some or 
many firms rationally choose mutual monitoring below the level that would 
be optimal in the absence of transaction costs.  A variant of this story is 
that CEO power, in practice, is “sticky” (Granovetter, 1985; Pfeffer, 1981).  
Once CEO power has been accumulated, it becomes increasingly difficult 
or expensive to remove or redistribute.  In addition, radical changes in the 
authority system generate nontrivial costs, such as costs of renegotiation, 
disruption, and turnover, etc.  Tirole (1999) categorizes contracting 
transaction costs into unforeseen contingencies, cost of writing contracts, 
and cost of enforcing contracts.  These costs tend to be higher when 
contracting with a more powerful CEO under weaker governance.   
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Also note that there are regulatory constraints on organizational 
changes that might enhance mutual monitoring.  The obvious example in 
my study is whether or not the second-in-command serves on the 
company board of directors.  The logic for including the No. 2 executive on 
the board is simple.  Fama and Jensen (1983) make that case in terms of 
mutual monitoring.  Moreover, executives who are also board members 
are likely to be fired only with consent of the board and thus are protected 
from reprisals from the CEO.  Nonetheless, the basic guidelines of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX) and the listing exchanges require firms to 
increase the representation on the board of nonemployee directors.17  
Moreover, audit, compensation, nominating, and governance committees 
must be comprised of at least three members, all of whom must be 
independent directors.  Allocating an additional board seat to an employee 
is difficult when there are pressures as well to reduce board size.  These 
various rules and pressures combined have reduced participation of 
employees on boards.18  In my data, in 2006 only 20% of the No. 2 
executives served on the board, as compared to 60% in 1993.   
                                            
17 In Section 7.4, I empirically study the “SOX effect” and provide further 
discussion.  
18An unintended consequence of SOX is likely to be a reduced connection 
between top executives and board and, thus, reduced mutual monitoring.  
One possibility is to resort to other channels to reconnect to the No. 2 
executives.  For example, No. 2 executives could be invited to attend their 
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In light of these considerations, a systematic relation between Q 
and my measures of mutual monitoring need not be surprising. 
MUTUAL MONITORING AND FIRM PERFORMANCE UNDER WEAK 
GOVERNANCE 
Agency costs can be reduced through a variety of methods.  A 
primary means is the use of a board of directors to monitor the CEO.  
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that the CEO will have more power when 
the board is weak, for instance, when there is a lower percentage of 
outsiders as directors, when there are fewer institutional shareholders, 
when the company has strong anti-takeover defenses, and when the 
board has a greater number of members.  It is precisely under such 
circumstances that internal governance, through mutual monitoring, for 
instance. 
Hypothesis 2: Mutual monitoring will have a stronger effect on firm 
performance when other governance mechanisms are weak.  In particular, 
firm performance will be more sensitive to the mutual monitoring measures 
when the board is larger and less independent, institutional holdings are 
lower, and the G Index is higher. 
                                                                                                                       
firms’ annual shareholders meetings, strategic retreats, board 
developmental programs, and related off-site activities. 
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To test this hypothesis, for each governance mechanism I divide 
sample firms into two groups of equal size, one group having “strong 
governance” and the other “weak governance”, as conventionally 
defined.19  I then explore the relationship between my four measures and 
Q within these two groups.  I include the following commonly used 
variables as proxies for governance strength.  
Board size: 
Agency problems become more severe in a larger board because 
of the “free-rider” problems.  While the advisory role of a large board can 
offset the costs of less effective monitoring and lower maneuverability 
(Coles et al., 2008), the CEOs can capture a larger board more easily and 
obtain excessive power in decision making (e.g. Jensen, 1993).  I 
separate the data into two halves, one with board size less than 10 
members and the other with board size of 10 or greater.  Missing values 
are excluded.   
As shown in Table 7 Panel A, when companies have larger boards, 
the estimated coefficient on GAP as a determinant of forward Q is 
significantly negative.  The coefficient on GAP for companies with smaller 
                                            
19 Note that “weak” here doesn’t necessarily mean bad.  A firm may form a 
“weak” board, for example, a less independent board because the board’s 
advisory role outweighs its monitoring role. In such cases, mutual 
monitoring may be an important supplement to board governance.   
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boards is also negative but, in contrast, not statistically significant.  The 
two coefficients are not statistically different.  The results in Panels B and 
D for board size support Hypothesis 2 that mutual monitoring is more 
valuable in firms with weak governance.   However, since Director-No. 2 is 
mechanically related to board size and board independence, we should 
interpret the relevant results with caution.  
Institutional Holdings: 
Similarly, I divide the sample with non-missing institutional holdings 
data into two halves.  The “weak” group has a minority institutional holding 
(<50% holding), and the “strong” group has a majority holding (>=50%).  
The estimated coefficient on GAP in the “weak” group is significantly 
negative.  Moreover, it is significantly different from the coefficient on GAP 
for the group with higher institutional ownership.  The results in Panels A, 
B, and C, but not D, are consistent with Hypothesis 2.    
Board Independence: 
I classify boards composed of 70% (median) or fewer independent 
directors as “weak” and remaining boards as “strong.”  In Panel A, the 
coefficient on GAP for firms with less independent boards is significantly 
negative and significantly more negative than the (slightly positive) 
coefficient on GAP for more independent boards.  This result supports 
Hypothesis 2, but results in Panels B, C, and D are not significant.  
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G Index: 
I partition the data into quartiles based on the G Index with missing 
values excluded.  The highest quartile has G Index ranging from 0 to 6.  
This quartile has “strong” governance on this dimension.  The weakest 
firms are in the lowest quartile, with G ranging from 11 to 24.  Panels A 
thru D show that the coefficients in high-G-Index group are not 
significantly different from the other coefficients in low-G-Index group.  The 
results do not support Hypothesis 2.   
For a one-standard-deviation increase in the GAP, the potential 
loss to the shareholders is about $30 million when the board is large; $131 
million when institutional holdings are low; and $73 million when the board 
is less independent. 
  
 
Table 7 
Mutual Monitoring and Firm Performance Conditional on Governance Measures 
 
 
Panel A: GAP 
 
Dependent Variable: Q t+1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Board Size  Institutional Holdings  
Board 
Independence  G Index 
  >=10 <10 
Diff 
P-val <50% >=50% 
Diff 
P-val <=70% >70% 
Diff 
P-val 11~24 0~6 
Diff 
P-val 
GAP -0.14* -0.11 0.65 -0.57** -0.19 0.02 -0.33*** 0.02 0.04 -0.07* -0.07 0.26 
 (0.07) (0.12)  (0.27) (0.17)  (0.11) (0.10)  (0.04) (0.15)  
             
Observations 5,178 5,501  1,006 2,305  5,919 4,737  4,755 3,672  
             
Adjusted R2 0.66 0.64  0.68 0.65  0.62 0.64  0.62 0.58  
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Panel B: Director-No. 2 
 
Dependent Variable: Q t+1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: President-No. 2 
 
Dependent Variable: Q t+1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Board Size  Institutional Holdings  
Board 
Independence  G Index 
  >=10 <10 
Diff 
P-val <50% >=50% 
Diff 
P-val <=70% >70% 
Diff 
P-val 11~24 0~6 
Diff 
P-val 
Director-No. 
2 0.07** 0.01 0.09 0.13* 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.05* 0.44 0.04* 0.03 0.21 
 (0.03) (0.02)  (0.07) (0.05)  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.02) (0.02)  
             
Observations 4,730 4,965  1,014 2,157  5,702 4,615  5,295 4,858  
             
Adjusted R2 0.53 0.51  0.65 0.62  0.53 0.53  0.64 0.62  
 Board Size  Institutional Holdings  
Board 
Independence  G Index 
  >=10 <10 
Diff 
P-val <50% >=50% 
Diff 
P-val <=70% >70% 
Diff 
P-val 11~24 0~6 
Diff 
P-val 
President-No. 2 0.02 0.05 0.34 0.12* -0.01 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.62 0.02 0.02 0.89 
 (0.02) (0.03)  (0.07) (0.05)  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.02)  
             
Observations 5,102 5,368  1,019 2,203  5,835 4,873  5,603 5,183  
             
Adjusted R2 0.53 0.53  0.66 0.62  0.52 0.53  0.65 0.67  
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Panel D: Independent-No. 2 
 
Dependent Variable: Q t+1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. The table shows OLS regressions with firm and year fixed effects for the cross-sectional yearly data from 1993 to 
2006. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. The independent variables are GAP in Panel A, Director-No. 2 in Panel B, 
President-No. 2 in Panel C, and Independent-No. 2 in Panel D. I separate data into two groups, weak governance and 
strong governance firms, based on board size, institutional holdings, independent directors and G index respectively. 
Board size is the number of directors. Institutional Holdings are the percentage of company's outstanding common shares 
held by institutions. Board Independence is the number of independent outside directors divided by board size. G Index is 
 Board Size  Institutional Holdings  
Board 
Independence  G Index 
  >=10 <10 
Diff 
P-val <50% >=50% 
Diff 
P-val <=70% >70% 
Diff 
P-val 11~24 0~6 
Diff 
P-val 
Independent-No. 
2 0.20* -0.03 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.65 0.09 0.06 0.74 0.19* 016* 0.82 
 (0.11) (0.09)  (0.10) (0.17)  (0.10) (0.09)  (0.09) (0.09)  
             
Observations 1,293 1,358  268 481  1,405 1,257  2,417 2,126  
             
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.63  0.77 0.78  0.63 0.65  0.53 0.50  
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the number of anti-takeover-provision (ATP) measures in a firm’s charter and in the legal code of the state where the firm 
is incorporated. Control variables include Age Difference, CEO Pay, Classified Board, Board Independence, Firm 
volatility, Firm size, Firm Size squared, Stock Ret 3yr , R&D, Advertising, Interest, New Finance, Capital Intensity, PPE, 
CEO WPS, Leverage, Earnings, Treasury Stock, ROA, Delaware, Year dummies and Firm dummies. Firm dummies are 
based on firm’s GVKEY in Compustat. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. The significance of the difference in 
coefficients (P-value) is also reported. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and presented in parenthesis. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
56
 57 
 
MUTUAL MONITORING AND INCENTIVES 
INCENTIVES FOR MUTUAL MONITORING 
 All of my four measures describe monitoring capacity of the No. 2 
executive.  However, it is likely that even with sufficient monitoring power, 
the No. 2 executives may still prefer colluding to monitoring.  Therefore, I 
further study the incentives for the second-in-command to monitor the 
CEO.  The hypothesis is that based on monitoring capacity, the No. 2 
executives still require proper incentives to do monitoring.  The first 
incentive I consider is the difference in appropriation horizons between the 
CEO and the No. 2.  Acharya, Myers, and Rajan (2011) suggest that 
internal monitoring is more operative in firms with greater age differences 
between the top two executives, namely with old CEOs who are about to 
retire and young No. 2’s who care about the future of their firms.  
Moreover, since elderly CEOs have less career or reputation concerns, 
mutual monitoring may be more effective.  I interact age difference 
between the top two executives with all four mutual monitoring measures.  
Results in Table 8 Panel A indicate that the effects of mutual monitoring 
are more pronounced in firms with larger age differences, signifying 
greater divergences in appropriation horizon. 
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Table 8 
Mutual Monitoring Incentives 
 
 
Panel A: Age Difference 
 
Dependent Variable: Q t+1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GAP  -0.04    
  0.05    
GAP*Age Difference -0.99*    
  0.57    
Director-No. 2  0.05*   
   0.03   
Director-No. 2*Age Difference  0.50*   
   0.30   
President-No. 2   0.07***  
    0.03  
President-No. 2*Age Difference   0.15  
    0.28  
Independent-No. 2    0.17** 
     0.08 
Independent-No. 2*Age 
Difference    -0.06 
     0.86 
Age Difference  0.21 -0.40 -0.25 -0.22 
  0.27 0.27 0.18 0.50 
 
Fixed Effect  Year+Firm Year+Firm Year+Firm Year+Firm 
      
Control Variables  Y Y Y Y 
      
Observations  18,873 18,873 18,873 4,551 
      
Adjusted R2  0.53 0.51 0.52 0.49 
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Panel B: CEO Duality 
 
Dependent Variable: Q t+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GAP 0.06    
 0.08    
GAP*CEO Duality -0.11    
 0.10    
Director-No. 2  0.12***   
  0.04   
Director-No. 2*CEO Duality  -0.10**   
  0.05   
President-No. 2   0.17***  
   0.05  
President-No. 2*CEO Duality   -0.12**  
   0.05  
Independent-No. 2    0.02 
    0.11 
Independent-No. 2*CEO Duality    0.13 
    0.14 
CEO Duality 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.09 
 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.09 
 
Fixed Effect Year+Firm Year+Firm Year+Firm Year+Firm 
     
Control Variables Y Y Y Y 
     
Observations 18,661 16,725 18,580 4,502 
     
Adjusted R2 0.53 0.51 0.53 0.49 
 
 
Note. The table shows regressions for the cross-sectional yearly data from 
1993 to 2006. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. The independent 
variables include GAP, Director-No. 2, President-No. 2, Independent-No. 
2, and their interactions with age difference in Panel A, and CEO duality in 
Panel B. Director-No. 2 is a dummy, with 1 for No. 2 is a board director, 0 
for not. President-No. 2 is a dummy, with 1 for No. 2 is the president of the 
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company, 0 for not.  Independent-No. 2 is a dummy, with 1 for No. 2 
joined the company before the CEO, 0 for not. Age difference is CEO’s 
age minus No. 2’s age, scaled by 100. CEO duality is a dummy, with 1 if 
the CEO is the chairman of the board. Control variables are CEO Pay, 
Board size, Institutional Holdings, Board Independence, G Index, 
Classified Board, Firm volatility, Firm size, Firm Size squared, Stock Ret 
3yr, R&D, Advertising, Interest, New Finance, Capital Intensity, PPE, CEO 
WPS, CEO tenure, Leverage, Earnings, Treasury Stock, ROA, ROS, 
Delaware, firm dummies, and Year dummies. All the variables are defined 
in Appendix A. Panel Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and 
presented in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
The CEO being the chair of the board (namely CEO duality) should 
discourage mutual monitoring from the No. 2 especially when the No. 2 
executive is a board member.  As shown in Table 8 Panel B, CEO duality 
cancels out the positive effects of Director-No. 2 and President-No. 2 on 
firm performance.  The results are consistent with that the CEO duality 
acts as a disincentive for mutual monitoring. 
CEO INCENTIVE 
 I’ve shown in Sections 5 and 6 that mutual monitoring is a 
substitute to other corporate governance systems.  Similarly, I hypothesize 
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that it is also a substitute to CEO incentive.  Because CEO incentive 
alignment can mitigate agency problem, mutual monitoring may become 
unnecessary when the CEO has sufficient incentives to work harder and 
better.  In Table 9, I use CEO wealth-for-performance sensitivity (delta) to 
interact with mutual monitoring measures.  The results support that mutual 
monitoring and CEO incentive are substitutes, and mutual monitoring is 
more valuable when CEO incentive alignment is deficient. 
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Table 9 
Mutual Monitoring and CEO Incentive 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Q t+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GAP -0.13**    
 0.06    
GAP*CEO Delta 0.13***    
 0.05    
Director-No. 2  0.07**   
  0.03   
Director-No. 2*CEO Delta  -0.07**   
  0.03   
President-No. 2   0.09**  
   0.03  
President-No. 2*CEO Delta   -0.03  
   0.03  
Independent-No. 2    0.10 
    0.08 
Independent-No. 2*CEO Delta    0.32* 
    0.17 
CEO Delta 0.04 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.02 
 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.09 
 
Fixed Effect Year+Firm Year+Firm Year+Firm Year+Firm 
     
Control Variables Y Y Y Y 
     
Observations 18,873 18,873 18,873 4,551 
     
Adjusted R2 0.53 0.51 0.52 0.48 
 
 
Note. The table shows regressions for the cross-sectional yearly data from 
1993 to 2006. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. The independent 
variables include GAP, Director-No. 2, President-No. 2, Independent-No. 
2, and their interactions with CEO delta. Director-No. 2 is a dummy, with 1 
for No. 2 is a board director, 0 for not. President-No. 2 is a dummy, with 1 
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for No. 2 is the president of the company, 0 for not.  Independent-No. 2 is 
a dummy, with 1 for No. 2 joined the company before the CEO, 0 for not. 
CEO delta is CEO’s wealth performance sensitivity scaled by 100. Control 
variables are CEO Pay, Board size, Institutional Holdings, Board 
Independence, G Index, Classified Board, Firm volatility, Firm size, Firm 
Size squared, Stock Ret 3yr, R&D, Advertising, Interest, New Finance, 
Capital Intensity, PPE, CEO WPS, Leverage, Earnings, Treasury Stock, 
ROA, ROS, Delaware, firm dummies, and Year dummies. All the variables 
are defined in Appendix A. Panel Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level, and presented in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
MUTUAL MONITORING AND INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
 The board should encourage mutual monitoring within the 
management team especially when information asymmetry between the 
board and the CEO is high. For instance, in a heterogeneous industry, it 
might be impossible or too costly for the board to assess the CEO’s 
performance and therefore the information generated from the mutual 
monitoring system may be crucial in solving information asymmetry.  On 
the contrary, information asymmetry in a homogeneous industry is low 
because the CEO’s performance can be so easily and accurately 
evaluated that mutual monitoring may not be particularly useful.  Following 
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Parrino (1997), I use the correlation between stock returns within 2-digit 
SIC industries to measure industry homogeneity.  Results in Table 10 
suggest that mutual monitoring is more valuable to the firms in 
heterogeneous industries than to those in homogeneous industries. 
 
Table 10 
Mutual Monitoring and Industry Homogeneity 
 
Dependent Variable: Q t+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GAP -0.07    
 0.07    
GAP*Homogeneity 0.07    
 0.11    
Director-No. 2  0.07*   
  0.04   
Director-No. 2*Homogeneity  -0.09*   
  0.05   
President-No. 2   0.22***  
   0.04  
President-No. 2*Homogeneity   -0.23***  
   0.05  
Independent-No. 2    0.15* 
    0.08 
Independent-No. 2*Homogeneity    -0.21 
    0.13 
Homogeneity -0.29*** -0.23*** -0.19*** -0.18** 
 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.08 
 
Fixed Effect Year Year Year Year 
     
Control Variables Y Y Y Y 
     
Observations 18,873 18,873 18,873 4,551 
     
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.17 
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Note. The table shows regressions for the cross-sectional yearly data from 
1993 to 2006. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. The independent 
variables include GAP, Director-No. 2, President-No. 2, Independent-No. 
2, and their interactions with Homogeneity. Director-No. 2 is a dummy, 
with 1 for No. 2 is a board director, 0 for not. President-No. 2 is a dummy, 
with 1 for No. 2 is the president of the company, 0 for not.  Independent-
No. 2 is a dummy, with 1 for No. 2 joined the company before the CEO, 0 
for not. Homogeneity is a dummy, with 1 if the firm is in a homogeneous 
industry (Parrino, 1997), 0 if not.  Control variables are CEO Pay, Board 
size, Institutional Holdings, Board Independence, G Index, Classified 
Board, Firm volatility, Firm size, Firm Size squared, Stock Ret 3yr, R&D, 
Advertising, Interest, New Finance, Capital Intensity, PPE, CEO WPS, 
Leverage, Earnings, Treasury Stock, ROA, ROS, Delaware, and Year 
dummies. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. Panel Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level, and presented in parenthesis. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 
Table 11 Panel A shows that SOX has the most significant effect on 
Director-No. 2.  In particular, 51% of the No. 2s were board member 
before SOX and only 33% after SOX.  The constraints on board 
independence imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may have 
unintentionally weakened mutual monitoring: some firms may be forced 
away from their equilibrium levels of mutual monitoring by a Director-No. 
2.  Therefore, it is not surprising to see in Column 2 of Table 11 Panel B 
the significantly positive coefficient on the interaction between Director-No. 
2 and SOX dummy, the only significant one among all four measures.  
Having a No. 2 as a board member is more valuable, though probably 
harder, in the post-SOX environment. 
 
Table 11 
Mutual Monitoring and SOX 
 
Panel A: Means before and after SOX 
 Pre-SOX Post-SOX 
GAP 0.42 0.46 
Director-No. 2 0.51 0.33 
President-No. 2 0.32 0.27 
Independent-No.2 0.53 0.58 
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Panel B: SOX Effect 
Dependent Variable: Q t+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GAP -0.06    
 0.06    
GAP*SOX -0.10    
 0.10    
Director-No. 2  0.02   
  0.03   
Director-No. 2*SOX  0.10**   
  0.05   
President-No. 2   0.06**  
   0.03  
President-No. 2*SOX   0.02  
   0.05  
Independent-No. 2    0.18** 
    0.08 
Independent-No. 2*SOX    -0.11 
    0.13 
SOX 0.49*** 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 
 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.13 
 
Fixed Effect Year+Firm Year+Firm Year+Firm Year+Firm 
     
Control Variables Y Y Y Y 
     
Observations 18,875 16,921 18,774 4,551 
     
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.50 
 
Note. The table shows the means of the measures before and after 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 and regressions for the cross-sectional yearly 
data from 1993 to 2006, in Panels A and B respectively. The dependent 
variable is Tobin’s Q. The independent variables include GAP, Director-
No. 2, President-No. 2, Independent-No. 2, and their interactions with 
SOX. Director-No. 2 is a dummy, with 1 for No. 2 is a board director, 0 for 
not. President-No. 2 is a dummy, with 1 for No. 2 is the president of the 
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company, 0 for not.  Independent-No. 2 is a dummy, with 1 for No. 2 
joined the company before the CEO, 0 for not. SOX is a dummy, with 1 if 
the firm-year is 2002 or after, 0 for not.  Control variables are CEO Pay, 
Board size, Institutional Holdings, Board Independence, G Index, 
Classified Board, Firm volatility, Firm size, Firm Size squared, Stock Ret 
3yr, R&D, Advertising, Interest, New Finance, Capital Intensity, PPE, CEO 
WPS, Leverage, Earnings, Treasury Stock, ROA, ROS, Delaware, and 
Year dummies. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. Panel 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and presented in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
EMPIRE BUILDING OR THE QUIET LIFE? 
While the above results suggest that the monitoring from the No. 2 
executive may enhance firm value by mitigating agency problems, they do 
not indicate which agency problem is being mitigated.  Immediate 
suspects include whether No. 2 executives curb managerial “empire 
building” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) or instead prevent CEOs from 
avoiding “cognitively difficult activities” and enjoying a “quiet life” (Bertrand 
and Mullainathan, 2003).  
It is theoretically plausible that both empire building and the quiet 
life damage firm value.  In reality, however, it is likely to be hard for the 
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board to judge when the CEO is extracting rents in these ways.   In Table 
12 following the methodology of Giroud and Mueller (2010), I attempt to 
distinguish between the “Empire Building” and the “Quiet Life” hypotheses.  
Panel A shows that the GAP is not significantly related to various “empire 
building” proxies, such as capital expenditures, asset growth, property, 
plant, and equipment (PPE) growth, the volume of acquisitions, and the 
likelihood of being an acquirer.  One plausible explanation is that the No. 
2s are reluctant to monitor such activities because they may benefit from 
empire building as well.  After all, for example, the No. 2 executive is likely 
to earn more in a larger firm. 
 
Table 12 
“Empire Building” or “Quiet Life” 
 
Panel A: Empire Building  
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Capital Asset PPE Acquisition Likelihood of
  Expenditures Growth Growth Ratio Being Acquirer
      
GAP -3.99 0.00 -0.08 11.94 -0.02 
 (3.43) (0.01) (0.08) (39.20) (0.02) 
 
Firm&Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 10,073 10,071 9,852 3,585 1,382 
      
Adjusted R2 0.87 0.40 0.20 0.29 0.41 
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Panel B: Quiet Life  
 
Dependent Variable: Selling,General& Advertising R&D Cost of Wages 
  Admin. Expenses Expenses Expenses Goods Sold  
      
GAP 11.88*** -0.01 1.48 25.76 0.20** 
 (4.40) (0.90) (2.26) (18.40) (0.09) 
      
Firm&Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 11,307 10,073 10,073 13,878 1,980 
      
Adjusted R2 0.84 0.82 0.76 0.82 0.85 
 
 
Panel C: Quiet Life and Interaction between GAP and Board  
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Selling, General& Advertising R&D Cost of Wages
  Admin. Expenses Expenses Expenses Goods Sold  
      
GAP -8.54 -3.84** -1.54 -58.32 0.42** 
 (9.18) (1.73) (2.79) (45.02) (0.18) 
      
GAP*InsiderBoard 2.72 2.64 1.16 69.34 -0.03 
 (10.15) (1.88) (3.03) (48.94) (0.17) 
      
GAP*BoardSize 41.69*** 1.98 -1.42 121.23*** -0.43**
 (10.21) (1.86) (2.99) (48.90) (0.18) 
      
Firm & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 6,678 5,848 5,848 8,218 1,126 
      
Adjusted R2 0.83 0.78 0.78 0.80 0.79 
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Panel D: CEO Compensation and Interaction between GAP and Board 
Dependent Variable: CEO Total CEO 
  Compensation WPS 
   
GAP -2.05 -2.55 
 (1.26) (3.40) 
   
GAP*InsiderBoard 1.56 1.92 
 (1.38) (3.71) 
   
GAP*BoardSize 3.83*** 5.29 
 (1.36) (3.66) 
 
Firm & Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
   
Observations 5,848 5,848 
   
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.79 
 
Note. The table shows OLS regressions with firm and year fixed effects for 
the cross-sectional yearly data from 1993 to 2006. In Panel A, dependent 
variables include Capital Expenditures, Asset Growth, PPE Growth, 
Acquisition Ratio, and Likelihood of Being Acquirer. Capital expenditures 
are normalized by total assets; Asset Growth is the percentage change in 
total assets from last year; PPE Growth is the percentage change in 
property, plant, and equipment from last year; Acquisition Ratio is the total 
value of all acquisitions made by the firm divided by total assets; 
Likelihood of Being Acquirer is a dummy variable = 1 if the firm makes at 
least one acquisition in the year and 0 if not. In Panel B and C, dependent 
variables include Selling, General & Admin. Expenses, Advertising 
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expenses, Costs of Goods Sold, R&D expenses, and Wages. Selling, 
General & Admin. Expenses are SG&A expenses normalized by total 
assets; Advertising expenses are normalized by total assets; Costs of 
Goods Sold are normalized by sales; R&D expenses are normalized by 
firm size; Wages are the natural logarithm of labor and related expenses 
normalized by the number of employees. In Panel D, dependent variables 
include CEO Total Compensation and CEO WPS. CEO’s total 
compensation is TDC1 from ExecuComp. CEO WPS is Wealth-for-
performance sensitivity, defined as the proportion of shares outstanding 
owned by the executive plus the proportion of shares outstanding in 
options awarded to the executive times the Black-Scholes hedge ratio. In 
Panels A B C and D, independent variables are lagged GAP, CEO Pay, Q, 
Firm size, and Firm Size squared. In Panel C and D, independent 
variables also include InsiderBoard, a dummy variable = 1 if there are 
more than 30% of inside directors and 0 if not, and BoardSize, a dummy 
variable = 1 if there are 10 or more directors and 0 if not. All the variables 
are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, 
and presented in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 
5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
In Panel B, I test the hypothesis by using various proxies for the 
quiet life as the dependent variable.  Consistent with the predictions of the 
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hypothesis, the GAP is positively correlated with overhead costs (selling, 
general and administrative expenses), R&D expenses, cost of goods sold, 
and wages.  The coefficients on overhead costs and wages are 
statistically significant, results which are consistent with the quiet life 
hypothesis.  If the second-in-command is not engaged in effective mutual 
monitoring, perhaps the CEO tends to grant extravagant overhead 
budgets to organizational units and avoid haggling with input suppliers and 
labor unions. 
In Panel C, I attempt to investigate whether the board governance 
and the monitoring from the No. 2 executive can supplement each other to 
mitigate the quiet life problem.  The GAP is shown in Section 4 to be a 
substitute for some governance measures, among which board 
independence and board size are the most significantly related.  Therefore 
I interact the GAP with the “insider board” dummy (1 for board with more 
than 30% of insiders) and the “board size” dummy (1 for board with 10 or 
more directors).  Columns 1 thru 4 have the predicted sign on 7 out of 
eight coefficients.  The only significant coefficients of the eight, however, 
are on board size interacted with GAP in columns 1 and 4.  In particular, 
the results imply that in the presence of a large board, the No. 2 executive 
may prevent the CEO from some quiet life activities which are otherwise 
hard to judge and control due to information asymmetry.  Panel D shows 
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that the GAP is positively correlated with future CEO pay, but not with 
future Wealth-performance sensitivity.  This relation again is more 
pronounced under weaker boards.  It suggests that the CEOs are able to 
enjoy higher pay and lower risk as a result of a less vigorous mutual 
monitoring.   
ENDOGENEITY 
Endogeneity is a concern.  However, it is hard to find a story for 
endogeneity to generate all the results based on all four measures.  
Furthermore, I carefully deal with endogeneity issue based on 
econometric remedies and economic theory. Below, for simplicity, I use 
the GAP measure as an example to illustrate my points, although the 
arguments are also valid for the other three measures. 
While the GAP may affect performance, so may Tobin’s Q affect 
the GAP.  First note that it is more likely that the GAP affects future firm 
performance, rather than future Q affecting the GAP.  One direct way is to 
investigate whether the GAP is associated with past Q or future Q.  I lag 
the GAP with respect to firm performance, as a Granger Causality test, 
and document the significant statistical and economic relation between the 
GAP and future Q.  As shown in Table 3 Panel A, GAP is positively linked 
to past Q.  The reason is likely that the CEO receives credit for good prior 
firm performance and thus higher compensation, which leads to a larger 
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GAP.  Note that, supposing that past Q and future Q are highly correlated, 
this positive effect works in favor of finding a positive relation between 
GAP and future Q.  Nonetheless, I find a negative relation.   
Second, beyond controlling for observable operational and 
governance characteristics, I also control for unobservable firm fixed 
effects and industry fixed effects.  Thus, the negative relation between the 
GAP and Q arises exclusively from time-series variation within each firm 
or industry.  Firm fixed effects capture firm specific characteristics, such as 
organizational culture and ethics, which influence the GAP and future Q 
simultaneously.  Graham, Li, and Qiu (2011) and Coles and Li (2010) 
show that firm fixed effects are important determinants of managerial 
incentives, pay level, and performance.  The firm fixed effect model 
removes these unobservable firm characteristics from the error term, 
ideally making the error term uncorrelated with the GAP thereby allowing 
the regression model to deliver an unbiased estimate.  Moreover, year 
effects, included in all specifications, potentially capture temporal 
variations in various market forces that affect both the GAP and future Q.   
Third, I control for past firm performance and use first differences 
model to show that after including past firm information, my measures still 
have incremental explanatory power to account for future firm 
performance.  As causality is basically a time-series relation, results from 
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such within-firm analysis also lend credibility to the notion that causality 
runs from the GAP to future Q.   
Fourth, I use instrumental variable approach to provide reasonable 
exogenous variation to identify the impact of mutual monitoring on firm 
performance. I show the instruments are valid based on economic 
theories and statistical tests. 
Other robustness checks (e.g. using industry-adjusted variables, 
decomposing the GAP into a predicted part and an unpredicted part, and 
controlling for a variety of relevant variables) all generate very similar 
results.  Almost all the control variables in the regressions have the 
predicted signs, further suggesting that the models I estimate are 
approximately correctly specified. 
FURTHER DISCUSSION 
This paper is based upon agency theory, more specifically the mutual 
monitoring framework.  I acknowledge, however, that the four measures of 
mutual monitoring potentially capture many other economic forces that 
can affect firm performance through channels other than mutual 
monitoring.  I provide the following discussion to explore such channels 
and explain why the results are supportive of the mutual monitoring story. 
THE “TALENT” STORY 
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 The No. 2 executive needs authority to access information and 
talent to analyze such information.20  Therefore, the “talent” component 
plausibly captured by the four measures also reflects monitoring 
capability.  The No. 2’s talent, however, could affect the firm through 
channels other than mutual monitoring, for example, through a direct 
channel by his own decision making or an indirect channel by providing 
advice to the CEO.  Although talent and monitoring capacity are not 
mutually exclusive, my four measures seem to be better and more direct 
proxies for mutual monitoring: 
 First, the “pay gap” literature always uses pay dispersion as a proxy 
for “CEO power” and no paper uses pay gap as a talent measure (e.g., 
Bebchuk et al., 2011).  Second, board membership is a more direct 
measure of monitoring role, the most basic judicial function, than talent 
(Fama, 1980).  Third, the presence of separate CEO and president 
positions is a more fundamental measure of organizational structure than 
talent (Levinson, 1993).  Fourth, the theoretical and empirical literature on 
“co-option” is clearly consistent with the mutual monitoring story, but no 
theory supports the talent story (Coles et al., 2010). 
                                            
20 A recent survey found employees with higher education and higher 
position were more privy to misconduct and were more likely to blow the 
whistle. (Wall Street Journal, 2011) 
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 Furthermore, all of the results from the four measures and their 
interactions with corporate governance, CEO incentive, mutual monitoring 
incentives, and info asymmetry are consistent with mutual monitoring, but 
not the notion that talent is the driver.  For example, for the result that 
mutual monitoring substitutes for board governance, it’s plausible that a 
weak board would use a monitoring No. 2 to substitute away from board 
monitoring, but it is hard to explain why a weak board would install a 
talented No. 2. 
THE “HEIR-APPARENT” STORY 
 If the four measures capture the presence of the No. 2 as the heir 
apparent, then such succession planning could affect corporate policy and 
performance.  Note, however, that an heir apparent exists only in a small 
portion of firms, while mutual monitoring is more prevalent.  Only 60% of 
firms use insider succession, among which some use tournament 
succession, and some don’t appear to use any succession planning.  
Thus, the heir apparent story has limitation of applicability, being relevant 
in a small set of companies, while mutual monitoring appears to be in 
place in most companies. 
Moreover, the four measures generally are more incisive proxies for 
monitoring: few papers use pay gap as a measure of the presence of an 
heir apparent; board membership is a more direct measure of the No. 2’s 
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monitoring role than succession; the position of president being only one 
small step from the CEO creates motivation for mutual monitoring 
(Levinson, 1993); and the independent-No. 2 measure is based on co-
option theory and empirical work (Coles et al., 2010).21  In addition, all of 
the results from the 4 measures and their interactions with corporate 
governance, CEO incentive, mutual monitoring incentives, and information 
asymmetry are in concert with the mutual monitoring hypotheses, but not 
succession-planning hypotheses. 
CONCLUSION 
The No. 2 executive is likely to be an important member of the 
managerial team.  Such importance arises in the normal ways associated 
with effective management, but also insofar as the second-in-command 
serves as a monitor of the CEO and other team members.  I develop 
measures of the presence and likely effectiveness of mutual monitoring by 
a No. 2 executive and assess the extent to which those measures are 
associated with firm performance, incentives of mutual monitoring, 
                                            
21 Some literature uses the president title as a proxy for heir apparent.  
Based on the fact that heir apparent is usually hired after the current CEO, 
the “hire-before-CEO” dummy should generate the opposite results to 
those from the “president” dummy.  However, these two measures provide 
consistent results in this paper, which suggests that in the setting of this 
research mutual monitoring is a more important economic force to drive all 
the results.  
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resources diverted to empire building or the “quiet life”, and various 
aspects of firm governance. 
I find that measures mutual monitoring from the second-in-
command are positively related to firm value, as measured by forward 
Tobin’s Q.  Furthermore, the relation is stronger the weaker is corporate 
governance otherwise, as measured by board size, institutional 
ownership, board independence, and takeover protections in place.  
Similarly the relation is stronger when CEO incentive alignment, delta, is 
low.  The effectiveness of mutual monitoring also depends on the 
incentives for the No. 2 executive to monitor the CEO, as proxied by age 
difference and CEO duality.  In addition, mutual monitoring seems more 
important for firms with high information asymmetry between the board 
and the CEO.  In terms of the channel connecting mutual monitoring to 
firm value, mutual monitoring appears to deter investment policy that 
allows the CEO to pursue the quiet life, but has little effect on empire 
building. 
Future research on mutual monitoring might be directed to 
developing less noisy, more incisive measures of mutual monitoring 
system, incentive, and environment.  Theorists and empiricists might 
address how to construct an effective mutual monitoring system and 
provide appropriate incentives to the No. 2 executive.  What 
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characteristics make the No. 2 executive an effective monitor?  How do 
specific monitoring activities regulate the CEO and thereby affect firm 
performance?  Can mutual monitoring prevent corporate fraud? In 
underperforming firms, can mutual monitoring facilitate more effective 
strategic change and CEO turnover?  
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VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
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Variable  Definition 
  Executive Characteristics:   
Director-No. 2  A dummy variable = 1 if No. 2 is a director in the firm 
and 0 if not.  
President-No. 2  A dummy variable = 1 if No. 2 is a president and 0 if not.
Independent-
No. 2  
 A dummy variable = 1 if No. 2 joined the company 
before the CEO and 0 if not. 
Female  A dummy variable = 1 for female and 0 for male. 
Tenure  The number of years since the executive joined the 
company. 
 
WPS (Delta)  Wealth-for-performance sensitivity, defined as the 
proportion of shares outstanding owned by the 
executive plus the proportion of shares outstanding in 
options awarded to the executive times the Black-
Scholes hedge ratio.  Refer to Appendix 2 for detailed 
calculation. 
 
WPS Gap  The gap of WPS between CEO and No. 2, calculated as 
(CEO’s WPS-No. 2’s WPS)/CEO’s WPS.   
 
Age Difference   CEO’s age – No. 2’s age. 
CEO Pay  CEO’s total compensation, TDC1 from ExecuComp, 
including salary, bonus, grants of restricted stock, grants 
of stock options, long-term incentive plan payouts, 
gross-ups for tax liabilities, perquisites, preferential 
discounts on stock purchases, contributions to benefit 
plans, severance payments, and all other 
compensation.  
  Board Structure: 
Board size  The number of directors in the board. 
Classified 
Board 
 A dummy variable = 1 if the directors in the board are 
elected to staggered terms instead of annual term and 0 
if not. 
 
Board 
Independence 
 The number of independent outside directors divided by 
board size.   
Institutional 
Holdings 
 Percentage of company's outstanding common shares 
held by institutions. 
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G-Index  The number of anti-takeover-provision (ATP) measures 
in a firm’s charter and in the legal code of the state 
where the firm is incorporated (Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick, 2003).  
 Firm characteristics: 
Q  The ratio of the sum of market value of equity and the 
book value of debt to total assets. 
 
Treasury stock  The dollar treasury stock scaled by total assets. 
Firm volatility  CDF of standard deviation of monthly stock returns in 
the past three years.  Refer to Appendix 3 for detailed 
calculation. 
 
R&D  Research and development expenses divided by total 
assets. 
Advertising  Advertising expenses divided by total assets. 
Leverage  Book leverage: Interest-bearing debt divided by total 
assets. 
Firm size  The natural logarithm of Net Asset where Net Asset is 
total asset less cash and short-term investments. 
 
Capital Intensity  Capital stock divided by total assets. 
ROA  Return on assets: Net income before extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations divided by total 
assets.  
 
Stock Ret 3yr  3 year return to shareholders with dividend reinvested. 
ROS  Return on sales: Operating income before depreciation 
divided by sales. 
 
Earnings  Earnings before extraordinary divided by total assets. 
Interest  Interest expense divided by total assets. 
Dividend  Common dividends divided by total assets. 
New Finance  Net New Equity Issues + Net New Debt Issues. 
PPE  Property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. 
Delaware 
 
 
 A dummy variable = 1 if the firm is incorporated in the 
state of Delaware and 0 if not. 
 
Capital  Capital expenditures divided by total assets. 
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Expenditures 
 
Asset Growth 
  
The percentage change in total assets from last year. 
 
PPE Growth 
 
Acquisition 
Ratio 
  
The percentage change in property, plant, and 
equipment from last year. 
 
The total value of all acquisitions divided by total assets.
 
Likelihood of 
Being Acquirer 
 
 A dummy variable = 1 if the firm makes at least one 
acquisition in the year, and 0 if not. 
 
Selling, General 
& Admin. 
Expenses 
 
 SG&A expenses divided by total assets. 
Costs of Goods 
 
 Cost of goods sold divided by sales. 
Wages  The natural logarithm of labor and related expenses 
divided by the number of employees. 
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CALCULATION OF WEALTH-PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY (WPS) 
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Jensen and Murphy (1990) developed this incentive measure which 
is analogous to the executive’s percentage ownership. WPS is provided 
primarily through executive stock and option holdings. The WPS of stock 
is simply the fraction of the firm’s stock that the executive owns. For 
options, I multiply the fraction of the firm’s stock on which the options are 
written by the deltas of the options. Option delta or called hedge ratio, 
defined as the sensitivity of option value to stock price, is the partial 
derivative of Black-Scholes call option value with respect to the share 
price. In this context, it can be thought of as a weight between 0 and 1 
indicating the likelihood that the option will end up in the money.  I use 
Black-Scholes (1973) model as modified by Merton (1973) to account for 
dividend payouts to evaluate executive stock options. On average, the 
delta is 0.75 for a new grant of long term stock option. It means that the 
option value increases by $0.75 if stock price goes up by $1. The total 
WPS is the sum of stock WPS and option WPS: $1000 * (# shares held + 
# stock options held*option delta)/common shares outstanding. The $1000 
is a scaling factor. 
Similar to past research, I find the CEOs’ WPS is about $39 per 
thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth. No. 2s’ WPS ($11.55 per 
thousand) is less than one third of the CEOs’.  
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APPENDIX C 
CDF 
 95 
Stock return variance is the relative risk measure within a firm that 
needs to be standardized to CDF. CDF provide useful information about 
the risk level of a firm relative to other firms. I follow this method (see 
Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999) except that I use standard deviation to 
generate CDF. Although all CDFs of stock return standard deviations for 
each firm-year are generated through computer programming. I’d like to 
use a simple example to demonstrate the algorithm of the method. 
ExecuComp provides stock return standard deviation for prior 60 
months, denoted BS_VOLATILITY. Suppose I have 3 firms and 2 years 
with volatility as follows.  
 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3
Year 1 0.2 0.3 0.5 
Year 2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
 
According to the definition of CDF, the minimum and maximum of 
CDF are zero and one for the lowest and highest volatility respectively. 
First I rank all volatilities in ascending order (with ranks from 0 to 5 in this 
case). Second, I count how many firm-year observations totally (6 in this 
case). Then CDF = rank / (count-1). For example: 
For firm 1 in year 1, CDF11 = Prob(volatility < 0.2) = 0 
CDF12 = CDF21 = Prob(volatility <= 0.3) = 0.4 
CDF22 = Prob(volatility <= 0.4) = 0.6 
CDF31 = CDF32 = Prob(volatility <= 0.5) = 1 
